

**Social Forces and the Effects of (Post)-Washington Consensus Policy in Africa:
Comparing Tunisia and South Africa**

by Stephen R. Hurt, Karim Knio and J. Magnus Ryner

Dr. Stephen Hurt, Department of International Relations, Politics & Sociology, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford, OX3 0BP. Tel: 01865 483972

Dr. Karim Knio, Institute of Social Studies, Kortenaerkade 12, PO Box 29976, NL-2502LT, The Hague, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 (0)70 4260 601

Prof. Magnus Ryner, Department of International Relations, Politics & Sociology, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford, OX3 0BP. Tel: 01865 483758

Abstract

This article addresses the consequences of Washington Consensus, and more recently post-Washington Consensus policy for democratic good governance in Africa. It acknowledges the increased focus in recent years of policy-makers on poverty as an important force in world politics. Despite this increased concern we argue that International Relations as a discipline, fails to offer a suitable framework for understanding poverty as a social force. The article proposes a revival of Robert W. Cox and Jeffrey Harrod's approach based on 'patterns of social relations of production'. This offers a disaggregation of the condition that is often referred to in the literature as 'the poor' or 'the informal sector'. We then outline a comparative research agenda based on the cases of Tunisia and South Africa. The article demonstrates how these cases provide the sternest test for assessing our scepticism of the prospects of reconciling market-led development with good governance, whilst also offering a 'most-different' comparison given their very different political cultures. In conclusion, we reflect on the methodological aspects to operationalising such a research agenda and propose an ethnographic approach informed by the work of Burawoy.

Keywords: Poverty, Good Governance, Social Forces, South Africa, Tunisia.

Introduction

This article is concerned with addressing the social question of global poverty that has been raised with regards to neo-liberal, market-led models of development, as articulated in the 1980s and the 1990s through the ‘Washington Consensus’. This question, first raised in 19th century Europe during the era of industrialization, refers in broad terms to the political consequences of the socio-economic inequality that is endemic to the current phase of global capitalism. It has recently been resurrected from the political margins and become increasingly central to the policy mainstream. The Washington Consensus has in many cases exacerbated the extreme conditions that people living in poverty endure. This article outlines an approach that provides the basis for a sustained analysis of the nature, social content and political directions taken by social forces and agents that arise from the adverse social conditions descriptively referred to as ‘poverty’ in developing societies, shaped by the legacies of Washington Consensus policies. In doing so the article seeks to highlight the relationship between social forces and international order.

In the immediate post-Cold War phase of triumphalist liberalism, Walrasian general equilibrium was held not only to become prevalent in the economic sphere, but also would express itself as liberal-democratic/pluralist/polyarchival harmony in the political and civil societal spheres as a Hegelian ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989). Huntington’s (1984, 1993) more pessimistic and competing hypothesis of globalisation provoking a ‘clash of civilizations’ has, however, increasingly eclipsed the liberal-triumphalist view, not least in the wake of 9/11 and the war on terror. However, Huntington’s cultural-essentialist conception has been criticised, and it is increasingly acknowledged that the politics that Huntington describes may have important socio-economic determinants in the persistence of

poverty in the Third World. This view is even held among prominent supporters of neo-liberalism, such as Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (2002). Bildt gives a lot of credence to Huntington's thesis, but he does not see 'the political implosions and social explosions' as inherent in a culture, but rather as the effect of socio-economic variables such as population growth and profile, the lack of economic growth, and declining standards of living. As Jeffrey Harrod (2006) makes clear, Bildt is by no means alone in his return to the 'fear' of the disorderly and potentially violent 'mass' that has occurred among ruling circles from time to time.¹

It is not only those who fear the masses from a security perspective who attribute political agency to the global poor. At the opposite end of the normative spectrum, critical theorists suggest that 'they' constitute an agency for dialectical change (Gill 1996, Davis 2006). Similar conclusions are behind the premises of reformers of the global development and governance agendas (e.g. UNDP 1999) who have prompted moves towards a 'Post-Washington Consensus', whereby market-led reform is flanked by the compensatory measures of democracy promotion as well as policies intended for poverty reduction and preventative security (e.g. UN Millennium Development Goals). Hence, the post-Washington Consensus can be understood as an attempt to introduce measures to offset the potentially negative political consequences of global poverty (see Gamble 2006, Robison 2006).

Yet although there seems to be a broad agreement of the importance of poverty as a social force of world politics, none of these perspectives offer a sustained and credible account as to why poverty might be such a social force. As Harrod puts it, then, there seems to be a broad agreement across the normative spectrum that

...the poor are either a threat or a force for change...what is needed is an analytical framework or approach that can help show why this is the case. Such an approach might also reveal the nature of the political attitudes, consciousness and forms of action of poor populations and the trajectories that social and political action might take (Harrod 2006: 39).

Poverty, Social Forces and International Relations: Shortcomings of the Discipline

Despite the increased concern with the impact of poverty on world politics, International Relations as a discipline, is ill-equipped to deal with the phenomenon due to its underdeveloped conceptions of the social determinants of world politics. Whilst it has been recognised for some time that the rise of non-state actors has rendered the neo-realist 'third image' analytical abstraction inadequate², the main analytical frameworks on offer are only helpful to a limited extent. Most analyses remain confined within the broad frame set by Keohane and Nye's 'complex interdependence' theory (1977) which in effect defines away questions of antagonisms and power in the realm of civil society. Antagonisms and power are seen as confined to the inter-state realm (still conceived of in neo-realist terms) whereas civil society is assumed to contain a Pareto-optimal, positive sum, pluralist politics of allocation.

Despite their contributions in other respects, this is also symptomatic of liberal constructivism, and the global civil society literature (e.g. Ruggie 1998, Archibugi et. al. 1998). Postcolonial and feminist literatures have partially redressed these limitations through their analyses of power relations in the cultural sphere and their effect on identity formation (e.g. Said 1993, Marchand and Runyan 2000), but generally lack a rigorous analysis of how these power relations are produced, reproduced and refracted in the context of material

circumstances. Whilst especially the feminist literature is cognisant of the complex interaction between economy and culture, analysis of varied power relations of production tends to be substituted for descriptive and overly generalised categories such as ‘the informal sector’ (e.g. Staudt 1998). The ‘informal sector’ category is a purely empty-negative term which defines matters exclusively in terms of what they are not (not formal), rather than attempting to understand that to which it refers on its own terms. Historical materialist theories tend to rely on equally descriptive, stylized and empty-negative concepts when concrete lived experiences of ‘the poor’ do not - as is often the case - conform to the abstract categories of the industrial proletariat or the peasantry (such as the ‘lumpenproletariat’, the ‘underclass’ and indeed the ‘informal proletariat’ (Davis 2006) or ‘the multitude’ (Hardt and Negri 2000)). More broadly, this reflects the privileging in historical materialism of the analysis of ruling classes and elites as agents of socio-political change as opposed to the subaltern (e.g. Brenner 1977, Gill 1990, Rosenberg 1994, Teschke 2003, van der Pijl 2006).

Research in area studies, political sociology and anthropology into social movements and ‘street politics’ may contribute to some extent to an understanding of poverty as a source of world politics. Bayat (2002), for instance, moves beyond a stylized conception of ‘poverty’ to a more nuanced conception of the social impacts of structural adjustment policies in the Middle East, and how this has generated particular kinds of mobilisation in civil society. Whilst structural adjustment may not have resulted in increases in poverty in absolute and aggregate terms, it has increased inequality, unemployment, and it has tended to undermine patrimonial-protective welfare policies as well as traditional-agrarian social relations. In other words, populations have become increasingly exposed to life-risks whilst the opportunities and scope for autonomous social mobilisation have increased due to the retreat of the regulatory capacities of the state. In a context shaped by the ‘retreat’ of the state and a rise of

the 'informal sector', mass protest and trade unionism have proven to be increasingly ineffective vehicles of activism whilst community activism has been feeble. Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) activism and social Islam have been more effective, but partial, in the problems they address, whilst 'quiet encroachment' (defined as 'direct action of individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives in a quiet, unassuming, illegal fashion') is ascendant on an increasingly urban and atomised social terrain.

The sort of research pursued by Bayat provides a useful contribution, but it can be complemented by a framework based on the work of Robert Cox and Jeffrey Harrod in two important respects.³ First, his research also refers to the problematic concept of the 'informal sector' and can be put on a more analytically rigorous footing by the power relations of production approach. Second, the Cox-Harrod framework provides an approach through which one can articulate more clearly the linkages between the local and the global, through what we call below 'the extended case method'. Having reviewed the weaknesses of the discipline of International Relations in being able to understand the role that social forces play in defining world order, our next task is to provide an elaboration of a revised version of the Cox-Harrod framework.

The Cox-Harrod Framework

The approach proposed here follows Robert W. Cox's analysis of social forces as the source and foundation of world politics. As is generally recognised, Cox sees the dynamics of world politics as emanating from historic structures consisting of interacting material capabilities (productive and destructive potentials), ideas (intersubjective meanings and collective images) and institutions, operating at the interrelated spheres of action of social relations of

production, forms of state (state-civil society complexes) and world order (Cox 1981). What is generally overlooked is the role this approach assigns to social relations of production. This is no doubt in part because of Cox's explicit foundations in Gramscian theory, emphasizing the ideological contingency of subject formation and the constitution of hegemonic order and challenge, which has gained resonance in an age influenced by constructivist and post-structuralist currents. However, whilst it is valid to emphasize ideational contingency in the work of both Gramsci and Cox, it is just as important to recognise that for them material practices and production nevertheless are important for subject and order formation. Whilst the latter cannot be 'read-off' material practices and production in a reductionist way, what Gramsci calls the 'economic-corporate moment' (1971: 181) nevertheless does provide an uneven terrain of potential articulations, as particular material experiences generate dispositions and elective affinities with particular ideological and cultural forms (see also Bourdieu 1977).

For Gramsci, the 'economic-corporate moment' is a 'refractory reality' where a 'tradesman feels *obliged* to stand by another tradesman... but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so' (1971: 181). In other words, broader class-categories, such as 'the bourgeoisie' or the 'working class' are to be understood as a form of political subjectivity fundamentally dependent on politico-ideological articulations, whilst shared experience at the level of social relations of production only generate common dispositions at the more disaggregate *class-fractional* level. It is an underestimated contribution by Cox (1987) and Harrod (1987) that they developed a more thought-through conception of how the 'economic corporate moment' should be understood and that they provided a way to relate this to world politics. We propose that the question of 'poverty' should be recast in these terms.

For Cox and Harrod the primordial dispositions of the ‘economic corporate moment’ are formed by power relations that people dialectically confront in their struggle over material survival. Power should in this context be understood in a broad sense as entailing material as well as ideational and institutional factors (such as the rationalities legitimating particular productive orders and institutions that reproduce these). Proceeding from identifying the varied power relations of production, they disaggregate the world’s working population on the basis of ‘patterns of social relations of production’, which generates a typology as accounted for in Table 1.4 As can be noted, the Marxian category of ‘proletarian’ features in the ‘enterprise pattern’, but empty-negative categories such as ‘Lumpenproletariat’ and ‘informal’ labour has been assigned analytical-positive identities – and have been disaggregated – through types such as ‘self employment’ and the ‘casual’ pattern.

** Insert Table 1 Here **

The condition that others refer to as the ‘global poor’, ‘informal sector’, ‘the underclass’, or the ‘multitude’, actually entails a variety of patterns of social relations of production, with radically different implications for dispositions of consciousness and mobilization. Hence, it is essential to disaggregate these social relations and classify them. To what extent is it the peasant pattern that is prevalent, as opposed to the self-employment pattern or the casual pattern, or the enterprise pattern (the proletarian condition as analyzed by Marx) or the household pattern? Given the highly varied power relations that are confronted in these production patterns, they generate highly varied modes of lived experience and dispositions of consciousness and mobilisation.

However, whilst the Cox-Harrod framework is highly suggestive and promising for a study of ‘poverty’ as a source of world politics, we lack a sustained empirical analysis that is informed by this framework or a systematic attempt to falsify or verify the structure of hypotheses contained in it. Indeed, we lack an adequate reconstruction of data for these purposes. In the rest of this article we set out a potential research agenda that we think can meet some of these challenges.

Defining Scope and Case Studies: Comparing Tunisia and South Africa

Our over-riding question is what is the composition of production patterns in the Third World, in the context of the post-Washington Consensus, and what are the implications for world politics? However, we narrow this question in two ways. First, in terms of the political impact of different patterns of production relations, we are primarily concerned with the viability or otherwise of democratic good governance in a post-Washington Consensus policy environment. Here, the Cox-Harrod framework suggests two key hypotheses: that self-employment lends itself to populist authoritarian politics⁶, and that the casual pattern lends itself to an oscillation between the extreme instrumentalism of survival and millennialism?⁷ If these hypotheses are proved correct, they carry important implications for the prospects for democratic good governance. If not, might the framework be parsimoniously modified to offer a compelling understanding of world politics anyway, or should the framework be abandoned?

Second, we narrow this question by focussing on two case-studies. The African continent provides numerous potential case-studies for such a research agenda. We propose to address the question of poverty, and the manner in which poverty generates dispositions of socio-

political force, by focusing on Tunisia and South Africa and asking whether post-Washington Consensus policies as practiced by the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and the Tunisian and South African governments, are likely to be adequate in reconciling economic growth with democratic good governance.

Tunisia is generally seen as the rare ‘success-story’ in post-Washington Consensus development policy (European Commission 2007a). As such it sets the sternest possible test for our own scepticism about the prospects of reconciling a market-oriented development model with good governance. Given the relative ‘success’ of economic development in Tunisia, if we can find evidence of the salience of the self-employment and casual production patterns and their hypothesized effects here, following Eckstein’s (1976) conception of a ‘critical case’, there are good grounds to suppose that these forces will be at work in other cases too. In the sub-Saharan setting, as its most developed economy, South Africa shares this attribute with Tunisia and is hence eminently comparable.

However, if the similarities that make Tunisia and South Africa comparable are important, their differences are even more valuable. Given the radically different political cultures of Tunisia and South Africa together they also constitute the basis of a ‘most-different’ comparison. In other words, if similar outcomes prove to be present in the two cases, despite radical differences of political culture, we are likely to be able to ‘distil’ (Przeworski and Teune 1970) the necessary and sufficient determinants of these conditions. Again, the comparison is ideally set up to test the Cox-Harrod hypothesis of similarities of dispositions arising out of similar power relations in production patterns notwithstanding politico-ideological and cultural variations.

Tunisia

Tunisian Washington Consensus policies originated with its 1986 application to the IMF and attendant Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), culminating in the 1993 adoption of the IMF Article of Agreement VIII, a liberalisation of trade and ultimately membership in GATT and full currency convertibility. But convergence with transnational neoliberalism has a decisively regional dimension in the Tunisian case, given the importance of the EU and particularly the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy.⁸ Tunisia was the first EMP country to conclude an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in July 1995. In measures that should be seen against the backdrop of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the dismantling of the Lomé Convention⁹, the AA phased in free trade in industrial products over a 12 year period, extending preferential access to EU markets in exchange for reciprocal and complete dismantling of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to industrial imports from the EU. Furthermore, the AA has facilitated comprehensive harmonisation of norms and regulations, phasing out monopolistic practices, government subsidies and privileged grants to state enterprises. This is flanked by EU financial support for ‘adjustment and development efforts’ in the shape of the European Mediterranean Initiative and funds under the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Instrument aimed at facilitating ‘political and security dialogue’, cooperation in the areas sorting under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar and ‘social, cultural and humanitarian partnership’. These compensatory measures indicate that EU policy is now more in line with post-Washington Consensus policy.

Tunisia is held up as the ‘master pupil’ amongst the Middle East and North African (MENA) Countries. However, whilst its average annual growth rates of about 4-5 percent and relative

macroeconomic stability are often construed as a 'success story' (European Commission 2007a), studies have shown that there is no positive linear correlation between economic growth in Tunisia and the reduction of poverty and the improvement of human development indicators (see FEMISE 2004, UNDP 2002). Even enthusiastic supporters of liberalisation policies, such as IMF economists Jbili and Enders, warned that the benefits would be 'negligible' if Tunisia's AA with the EU resulted in a 'hub and spoke effect' whereby investors choose Europe as the site of production for the Tunisian market (1996: 19). The European Commission (2007a) has also stated that levels of investment and gross fixed capital formation are a serious cause for concern and even official unemployment rates remain stubbornly high at 14-16 percent. Indeed, at about 4 percent, Tunisian annual average growth rates are estimated by the Commission to be about 2 percent too low to actually decrease unemployment (European Commission 2007a: 7).

This speaks volumes about the social effects resulting from a large proportion of youths entering working age, labour-shedding as state-corporatist enterprises adjust to market competition and state employment being reduced (Farsakh 2000, FEMISE 2004). In addition we have seen privatization in the agrarian sector with transfers of land from cooperatives to large landowners (King 1999, 2003). This is a process that David Harvey (2003) has called the 'political economy of dispossession', displacing rural populations from agrarian forms of subsistence.¹⁰ And indeed, Tunisia has not been immune to the growth of urban slums such as Tunis' southern fringe (Ettadhamen, Mellassine and Djebel Lahmar) (Davis, 2006: 25, 109). And although the poverty rate, measured in terms of the \$1 a day indicator, has fallen, this is most likely just a reflection of an increased role of cash in the economy due to the decline of the agrarian sector as a proportion of the workforce. It is widely acknowledged that

‘poverty’ and social dislocations are serious concerns in Tunisia. These developments have ominous consequences for the prospects of democratic development.

Yet, symptomatic of much of comparative and political economy (Amoore 2006), there are serious deficits in the literature on Tunisia as the analytical focus remains on elites and the ‘subaltern’ are conceptualised in unhelpfully stylized categories. The concern in question can in fact be characterised by a consensus view that unites neo-Weberians with neo-Marxists: a ‘praetorian’¹¹ political elite occupying the structures of the patrimonial state generating rents from a private sector, which in Tunisia is reliant on world markets. The EMP and *mise a niveau* represents an adjustment of tactics for the securing of such accumulation, but it does not represent a major transformation of this state form. In turn, the ‘bourgeoisie’ is economically dependent on selective benefits and policies of the state for their economic activities, creating a system of selective and personality-based/group-specific links of benefits and obligations. These linkages are also extended selectively to ‘workers’, through corporatist unions and to ‘peasants’ in exchange for loyalty to the praetorian elite. One of the effects of structural adjustment has been to narrow the scope of distribution to the latter, opening up the space for political contestation by ‘Islamist’ counter-elites. This in turn has prompted the need for more repressive policies (Murphy 2001, 2006: 523-24, Ayubi 1995, Bellin 2002).

In this consensus view, structural adjustment and other market-promoting reforms do not transform these relations, then, but is rather refracted through them. King (1999) illustrates vividly how structural adjustment and patrimonialism operates symbiotically on the countryside, as the sell-off of state lands lead to a dismantling of cooperatives and purchases

of landowners with favourable connections to the state, whilst not resulting in a more efficient use of these lands.

Such modes of analysis take us some way towards understanding the social relations to which the state adjusts itself, through a mix of measures that combine consent and coercion. However, it only goes so far in terms of understanding the motivations and political dispositions of those who are excluded and marginalized. As a result, it is difficult to assess the regime's claim that authoritarianism is necessary for socio-political stability and security (including European security). In other words, there is a lacunae in our understanding of the relationship between 'economic forms' and 'political forms', because there is a gap in our understanding of the dispositions of political agency of social forces that are assumed to be a threat to social order. This literature provides no clear answer as to whether they are likely to be socially integrated through democratic politics, or what kind of economic reforms would be required to make their socio-political dispositions democratic. Hence we are back at the analytical lacunae identified by the citation of Harrod (2006) in the introduction to this article and one of the crucial places where we think the Cox-Harrod framework can be useful.

The second strand in the existing literature does focus on emerging political identities but from a constructivist standpoint. One example is Frederic Volpi's useful analysis of the political situation in the Islamic world (2004a, 2004b). Unlike Huntington, Volpi is cogniscent of the non-monolithic, dynamic and social dimensions of Islamic discourse (e.g. Pasha and Samatar 1995, Cox 1995). However, it is also an approach that does not reduce international norms to a teleology where liberal regimes are assumed to progressively unfold towards a Kantian 'perpetual peace' cum Deutschan¹² 'security community' just because communicative linkages are established. Volpi (2004b) offers his own account of the 'forms

of life' of prevailing norms in MENA societies, based on linguistic pragmatism (as pioneered by the late Wittgenstein and Winch). For Volpi, the introduction of liberal norms through various international regimes is interacting with indigenous 'life forms' ('Republican' and 'Islamic' conceptions) so as to nurture different and competing conceptions of democracy (understood as 'majority rule').¹³ These norms may ally with liberal conceptions in struggle and negotiation with one another, producing a stalemate which Volpi calls 'pseudo-democracy'. Central in this context are the concepts of *assibiyya* – tribal 'group-feeling' that has been central to praetorianism and that finds its modern expression in Arab nationalism and *ummah* – the community of the faithful, informing Islamic conceptions of democracy. Given that the tension between these conceptions generates perceived or real security problems for western powers, it also means that the liberal democratic conception adjusts to the 'pragmatic articulation of opportunities' and hence reinforces the 'pseudo-democratic' constellation (hence the discrepancy between the western ideal of democracy and the concrete western policies pursued).

Insofar as semiotics – whether in its (post-) structuralist or pragmatist variants – has persuasively argued that socio-political subjects cannot be 'read-off' the socio-economic positions in terms of a necessary causal link between 'base' and 'superstructure', the constructivist dimension must be taken seriously.¹⁴ Volpi's analysis does also suggest that it is simplistic and reductionist to assume that socio-economic position determines fully formed socio-political subjects that merely draw on group-feeling and religion to advance their fully formed material interests, as if group and religious norms, as such, had no causal power at all in the determination of subject identity. However, this does not mean that norms can be treated as ontologically primitive variables, nor that they are completely malleable and without any regard to the socio-economic, which shapes the uneven terrain of potential

subject-articulations. Whilst subject identity cannot be ‘read off’ production, it is important to remember that they themselves need to be produced. Volpi himself concedes as much when he concludes that the ‘outcome of ideological oppositions ...are also grounded in pragmatic socioeconomic choices and opportunities’ (2004b: 1073). However, he offers no views with regard to how these socio-economic choices and opportunities should be understood. His pragmatic ‘life-forms’ seem to exist as surrealist statues in the desert, with no account of the material conditions of emergence (or production) and survival (or reproduction).

The Cox-Harrod framework can provide a basis from which to meet the deficiencies of these two literatures. On the one hand, it allows for greater nuance and attention to the different political subjectivities of subaltern groups than is allowed for in the neo-Weberian/neo-Marxist accounts. On the other hand, it allows for a better understanding of the material production and reproduction of different subjectivities than is possible from within the constructivist approach. The challenge here is to grasp the over-determined relationship between the material and the ideational, where we accept that subject formation is the outcome of a contingent logic of discursive articulation, but that we also accept that social subjects depend on socio-economic relations.

South Africa

After the end of apartheid, South Africa initially followed a model of development broadly in line with the Washington Consensus and in recent years the post-Washington Consensus. An early indication of the neo-liberal model was evident in South Africa’s negotiations with the EU that began in 1995 and culminated in a Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which became operational at the start of 2000. The South African government saw

the TDCA as an important factor in encouraging the further integration of post-apartheid South Africa into the world economy (Lee 2002: 81). Former Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, described how the TDCA would be positive both in terms of increasing the flows of trade, investment and technology into South Africa and in enhancing productivity and stimulating exports, leading to economic growth (Erwin 2000: vii). As Hurt has suggested previously ‘it is clear that in its relations with the EU, the South African government was in broad acceptance of the neo-liberalism that dominates the world’s multilateral institutions (Hurt 2006: 101). Such a position has also been reflected in domestic policy formulation within South Africa. The shift from the more Keynesian-inspired Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1996 is the most obvious example.

More recently the EU’s strategy towards South Africa has shifted towards the post-Washington Consensus. There is still a faith in the liberalisation of the economy but the state is given a complementary role in providing both education and an infrastructure conducive to economic growth. This approach is reflected in the Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (European Commission 2007b) and the associated Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2013 (MIP) for South Africa (European Commission 2007c). The focus on poverty alleviation is made very clear. The Country Strategy Paper outlines how Europe will focus on three main areas of development cooperation with South Africa:

1. To promote pro-poor, sustainable economic growth.
2. To improve the capacity and provision of basic services for the poor.
3. To promote good governance. (European Commission 2007b: 30).

Again such a position has been matched by recent developments in domestic policy-making. In February 2006 the South African government launched its Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). The aim of AsgiSA is to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014. It is not a new policy as such, and the basic method for achieving these aims remains the GEAR and its emphasis on growth first and foremost. What AsgiSA highlights is some of the constraints that have hindered progress in achieving high enough levels of economic growth. It focuses on economic infrastructure (road, railways, electricity, water, etc.) and social infrastructure (schools, housing, health provision, etc.). It also focuses on the lack of skills by targeting both schooling and training programmes.

GEAR presented a highly optimistic scenario regarding job creation, caused by private investment via economic growth. Whilst prioritising macroeconomic stability over other objectives, GEAR was certainly conceived as a means of addressing poverty through the boosting of business formation and employment through multiplier and accelerator effects. Hence, GEAR set very ambitious targets - and painted a highly optimistic scenario - for job creation and economic growth, almost wholly dependent on the performance of the private sector (Department of Finance 1996: 6). Whilst the macroeconomic stabilisation record is broadly consistent with the GEAR strategy, however, not even the most ardent supporters of GEAR can deny that the record on investment and growth has been disappointing and that the record on employment has been nothing short of disastrous (Trevor Manuel cited in Streak 2004: 278). Ominous social consequences of the economic strategy and its failure to meet growth and employment objectives are also intimated in the literature. It has been suggested that 'apart from the ethically odious (and increasingly dangerous) prospect of living in one of the world's most unequal economies, such a polarised environment is fertile ground for social and political instability' (Williams and Taylor 2000: 37). Yet, consistent with the argument

made earlier in this article none of these studies contain a rigorous analysis of how these adverse conditions might actually translate into a political agency of ‘the poor’.

However, Spiess’ (2004) contributes in a significant way towards a rigorous formulation of the problematic, clearly influenced by neo-Marxist as well as neo-Weberian theory on state autonomy. South Africa faces the classical contradiction involved in promoting the conditions for capital accumulation while maintaining political legitimacy. In this situation, many post-colonial states have resorted to patrimonial and populist clientelism as the requisite state autonomy from the ‘clamour of special interests’ is absent. Given the popular support for the ANC and its efforts to strike a principled distributive bargaining framework (with business and organised labour in the ‘tripartite alliance’) it may be possible to assert a state autonomy that nevertheless is still ‘socially embedded’ (hence relying on ‘infrastructural power’ rather than ‘coercive power’). The question here is whether it is possible to keep the heterogeneous social coalition of interests that constitute the ANC movement together within an effective socio-economic paradigm of governance (Spiess 2004: 140-41). Indeed, the debate within the tripartite alliance, between the government elites and COSATU over economic policy can be seen exactly as expressing tensions in this coalition. Yet, the process of subject formation that may be engendered by the social antagonisms related to poverty and inequality still remains a ‘black box’ in Spiess’ analysis.

Spiess’ point of arrival is the point of departure for social movement analysis. Ballard et. al. (2005, see also Desai 2003) offer a panoramic review both of the literature on social movements in South Africa as well as of empirical developments in the post-GEAR era after the mid-1990s. They affirm a realignment of social forces, where a set of social movements and organisations have been formed outside the ANC and state structures, ‘overwhelmingly’

due to ‘worsening poverty, with struggles addressing both labour issues and consumption issues’ though ‘some’ movements also address ‘social exclusion in terms of gender, sexuality and citizenship that sit at the intersection of recognition and redistribution’ (Ballard et. al. 2005: 615). No doubt, this literature has significant descriptive value. Yet, even though it is unanimous on the importance of ‘poverty’ for these social movements, it lacks any serious attempt to develop an analytical framework that links the lived experience of these adverse material conditions to dispositions of subject-formations, modes of political consciousness and power mobilisation. The lack of analysis is substituted with blanket descriptions such as ‘poverty’, ‘the poor(s)’ as if this is a meaningful aggregation of lived experiences that generate subject formation, or alternatively by empty conceptual negations. This is a problem that has rightly been identified by post-structuralists, who point to the complex nature of subject formation and the problematic issues involved in intellectual representation of the ‘subaltern’ (e.g. Howarth 1998, Walsh 2008).

Yet, post-structuralism and constructivism cannot be read in the South African case in such a way as to suggest that material conditions do not matter. There seems to be a consensus that ‘poverty’ is a key context for social mobilisation. Walsh’s (2008) (auto-) critique, pointing to the importance of a more differentiated approach to ‘poverty’, which acknowledges the problematic and socially constructed nature of that concept for ‘governmentality’ purposes, seems apt indeed. Yet whilst her reflections on the problem of ‘power effects’ (*pace* Burawoy 1998) inherent in intellectual representation in ‘action-based’ ethnographic research is spot on, she does not herself contribute to an analytical frame which differentiates the lived experiences of those that categories such as ‘the poor’ seek to capture. As with the case of Tunisia, we suggest that the Cox-Harrod framework provides the means with which to address these weaknesses.

Conclusions: A New Research Agenda

This article has argued that despite the increased recognition of ‘poverty’ for world politics, there is a lack of conceptual and methodological rigour in the way that the literature deals with it. We have pursued this argument on descending levels of abstraction, commencing with a discussion of the general state-of-the-art in International Relations. Thereby we made our general case for revisiting Cox and Harrod’s conception of patterns of social relations of production. It was our argument that this facilitated a more disaggregated and nuanced analysis than suggested by the descriptive, over-generalising term poverty, by providing a judicious analysis of the complex interaction of the material and ideational in subaltern subject formation. We then proceeded to concretise our case through a reflection on the literature on the situation in Tunisia and South Africa that we have identified as constituting a critical two-case comparison.

Using the revised version of the Cox-Harrod framework outlined above we hope to demonstrate a much deeper understanding of the political consequences of the socio-economic effects of Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus policy. There will be problems operationalising such a research agenda but we think these can be overcome by employing a more formalised ethnographic method informed by Michael Burawoy’s ‘extended case method’ (1998). This is an approach that is not exclusive to Tunisia and South Africa as one could conceive of it being used in many different situations.

The first step entails a reconstruction of demographic data to map the populations of Tunisia and South Africa in terms of the power/production relations they encounter in their struggle

for survival. This is a challenge because the available statistical categories are not geared towards capturing power/production relations. Nevertheless, exploratory studies have indicated that rough proxies can be reconstructed from especially ILO data and to a lesser extent UNDP data (Ryner 2006). We expect that national and local statistics in the cases under consideration would enhance the prospects for doing so and to reconstruct a comparable data-set in the two cases. Leysens (2006) has also demonstrated that the *Afrobarometer* survey can be used for this purpose.

This data should provide the basis for identifying fields for more intensive qualitative research. As we have argued in this article, in both Tunisia and South Africa there are large incidences of ‘urban poverty’ – populations that are neither no longer peasants nor have been integrated into anything that resembles a labour market. We are particularly interested in disaggregating these populations, deploying the revised Cox-Harrod categories such as the ‘casual pattern’ and ‘self employment’. Having identified fields, probably in sites such as Tunis’ southern fringe and Kayamandi in the Western Cape of South Africa, we will conduct narrative interviews with populations inhabiting these power/production patterns and use discourse analytical techniques to interpret the material. Here we are not primarily interested in content analysis, which no doubt will be highly saturated with cultural contingencies. Instead, combining Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Foucault’s concept of *episteme*, we are interested in finding out how a discourse needs to be structured in a certain setting to be taken seriously. We are interested in testing the Cox-Harrod claim that there is a correspondence between these discourses and the power/production patterns inhabited and that these transgress the specificities of culture. We would then seek to triangulate the material gathered with semi-structured interviews with state agencies and social movements about the constraints, prospects and strategies that might be deployed in effectively regulating or

mobilising the populations in question. Together these two forms of research should contribute to a better understanding of the factors determining what kind of agencies might emerge from 'poverty' in a post-Washington Consensus world in general and the prospects for democratic good governance in particular.

References

AMOORE, L. (2006) 'Invisible Subject(s): Work and Workers in the Global Political Economy', in M. DAVIES and M. RYNER (eds.) *Poverty and the Production of World Politics: Unprotected Workers in the Global Political Economy*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14-37.

ARCHIBUGI, D., D. HELD and M. KÖHLER (1998) *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity.

AYUBI, N. (1995) *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, London: IB Tauris.

BALIBAR, E. (1993) 'Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: The Fear of the Masses' in E. BALIBAR (ed.) *Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx*, London: Routledge, pp. 3-38.

BALLARD R., A. HABIB, I. VALODIA and E. ZUERN (2005) 'Globalization, Marginalization and Contemporary Social Movements in South Africa,' *African Affairs* 104, 417: 615-634.

BAYAT, A. (2002) 'Activism and Social Development in the Middle East' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, 1: 1-28.

BEALL, J. (2002) 'Globalization and Social Exclusion in Cities: Framing the Debate with Lessons from Africa and Asia' *Environment & Urbanization* 14, 1: 41-51.

BEALL, J., O. CRANKSHAW and S. PARNELL (2000) 'Victims, Villains and Fixers: The Urban Environment and Johannesburg's Poor', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, 4: 833-855.

BELLIN, E. (2002) *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labour and the paradox of State-Sponsored Development*, Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press.

BILDT, C. (2002) 'Towards a Clash of Civilizations?,' Bundesnachrichtendienst Symposium, Pullach Germany, November 7, www.bildt.net/index.asp?artid=454 (Accessed April 18, 2007).

BOURDIEU, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BRENNER, R. (1977) 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review* 104 (old series): 25-92.

BURAWOY, M. (1998) 'The Extended Case Method', *Sociological Theory* 16, 1: 4-33.

COX, R. W. (1981) 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, 2: 126-155.

COX, R. W. (1987) *Production, Power and World Order: Power and Production Volume 1*, New York: Columbia University Press.

COX, R. W. (1995) 'Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations,' *Studies in Political Economy* 47: 7-31.

DAVIES, M. and M. RYNER (2006a) 'Power, Production and World Order Revisited: Some Preliminary Conclusions' in M. DAVIES and M. RYNER (eds.) *Poverty and the Production of World Politics: Unprotected Workers in the Global Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 223-243.

DAVIES, M and M. RYNER (2006b) *Poverty and the Production of World Politics: Unprotected Workers in the Global Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

DAVIS, M. (2006) *Planet of Slums*, London: Verso.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (1996) *Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy*, Pretoria: Department of Finance.

DESAI, A. (2003) 'Neoliberalism and Resistance in South Africa,' *Monthly Review* 54, 8: 16-28.

DEUTSCH, K. W., S. A. BURRELL and R. A. KANN (1957) *Political Economy and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

ECKSTEIN, H. (1976) 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science,' in F. GREENSTEIN and H. POLSBY (eds.) *Handbook of Political Science Volume 7*, Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, pp. 79-137.

ERWIN, A. (2000) 'Preface' in T. BERTELSMANN-SCOTT, G. MILLS and E. SIDIROPOULOS (eds.) *The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union*, Johannesburg: SAIIA, pp. vii-viii.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007a) *Tunisia Strategy Paper 2007-2013 & National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*, Brussels: European Commission.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007b) *Cooperation Between the European Union and South Africa: Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, Brussels: European Commission.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007c) *South Africa: Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2013*, Brussels: European Commission.

FARSAKH, L. (2000) 'North African Labour Flows and the Euro-Med. Partnership', *European Journal of Development Research* 12, 1: 58-79.

FEMISE (2004) *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, December 2004.

FUKUYAMA, F. (1989) 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, 16: 3-18.

GAMBLE, A. (2006) 'Two Faces of Neo-Liberalism' in R. ROBISON (ed.) *The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 20-38.

GILL, S. (1990) *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GILL, S. (1996) 'Globalization, Democratization and the Politics of Indifference', in J. MITTELMAN (ed.) *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 205-228.

GRAMSCI, A. (1971) 'Analysis of situations: the relations of force', in Q. HOARE and G. NOWELL SMITH (eds.) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, pp. 175-185.

HARDT, M. and A. NEGRI (2000) *Empire*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

HARROD, J. (1987) *Power, Production and the Unprotected Worker: Power and Production Volume 2*, New York: Columbia University Press.

HARROD, J. (2006) 'The Global Poor and Global Politics: Neomaterialism and the Sources of Political Action', in M. DAVIES and M. RYNER (eds.) *Poverty and the Production of World Politics: Unprotected Workers in the Global Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 38-61.

HARVEY, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

HOWARTH, D. R. (1998) 'Paradigms Gained? A Critique of Theories and Explanations of Democratic Transition in South Africa', in D. R. HOWARTH and A. J. NORVAL (eds.) *South Africa in Transition*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 182-214.

HUNTINGTON, S. (1984) 'Will More Countries Become Democratic?', *Political Science Quarterly* 99, 2: 193-218.

HUNTINGTON, S. (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3: 22-49.

HURT, S. R. (2003) 'Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention', *Third World Quarterly* 24, 1: 161-176.

HURT, S. R. (2006) 'Post-Apartheid South Africa and the European Union: Integration over Development?' in D. LEE, I. TAYLOR and P. D. WILLIAMS (eds.) *The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 100-117.

ILO (2007) <http://laborsta.ilo.org> (accessed August 17, 2007).

JBILI, A. and K. ENDERS (1996) 'The Association Agreement Between Tunisia and the European Union', *Finance and Development* 3, 3: 18-20.

KEOHANE, R. O and J. NYE (1977) *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little Brown.

KING, S. J. (1999) 'Structural Adjustment and Rural Poverty in Tunisia,' *Middle East Report*, 210: 41-43.

KING, S. J. (2003) *Liberalization against Democracy: The Local Politics of Economic Reform in Tunisia*, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.

LACLAU, E. (1988) 'Metaphor and Social Antagonism', in C. NELSON and L. GROSSBERG (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 249-258.

LEE, M. C. (2002) 'The European Union – South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In Whose Interest?', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 20, 1: 81-106.

LEYSENS, A. J. (2006) 'Social forces in Southern Africa: transformation from below?', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, 1: 31-58.

MARCHAND, M. and A. S. RUNYAN (eds.) (2000) *Gender and Global Restructuring: Sights, Sightings and Resistances*, London: Routledge.

MOSER, C. O. N. (2004) 'Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap,' *Environment & Urbanization* 16, 2: 3-16.

MURPHY, E. C. (2001) 'The State and the Private Sector in North Africa: Seeking Specificity', *Mediterranean Politics* 6, 2: 1-28.

MURPHY, E. C. (2006) 'The Tunisian Mise a Niveau Programme and the Political Economy of Reform', *New Political Economy*, 11 (4): 519-540.

NICHIPORUK, N. (2000) *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation.

PASHA, M and A. SAMATAR (1995) 'The Resurgence of Islam' in J. MITTELMAN (ed.) *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 187-201.

PERLMAN, J. E. (2002) 'Marginality: from Myth to Reality', Paper Presented at Mega-Cities/Trinity College World Bank Symposium, December 9-11.

PERLMAN, J. E. (2003) Longitudinal Panel Studies in Squatter Communities: Lessons from a Re-Study of Rio's Favelas 1969-2003,' Joint DPU-ODI-DFID World Bank Workshop Urban Longitudinal Research Methodology, London, May 28-29.

PRZEWORKSKI, A. and H. TEUNE (1970) *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, New York: Wiley.

ROBISON, R. (2006) 'Neo Liberalism and the Market State: What is the Ideal Shell?' in R. ROBISON (ed.) *The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3-19.

ROSENBERG, J. (1994) *The Empire of Civil Society*, London: Verso.

RUGGIE, J. G. (1998) *Constructing the World Polity*, London: Routledge.

RYNER, J. M. (2006) 'Workers of the World...: The "Economic Corporate Moment" of Contemporary World Politics,' in M. DAVIES and M. RYNER (eds.) *Poverty and the Production of World Politics: Unprotected Workers in the Global Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 62-88.

SAID, E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Vintage.

SPIESS, C. (2004) 'Betwixt and Between': The South African State's Search for Autonomy in the Face of Globalisation', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 42, 1: 129-155.

STAUDT, K. (1998) *Free Trade: Informal Economies at the US-Mexican Border*, Philadelphia, PA.: Temple University Press.

STREAK, J. C. (2004) 'The Gear legacy: did Gear fail or move South Africa forward in development?', *Development Southern Africa* 21, 2: 271-288.

TESCHKE, B. (2003) *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, London: Verso.

UNDP (1999) *Human Development Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UNDP (2002) *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, New York: UN.

VAN DER PIJL, K. (2006) *Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq*, London: Pluto Press.

VOLPI, F. (2004a) 'Regional Community Building and the Transformation of International Relations: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', *Mediterranean Politics* 9, 2: 154-64.

VOLPI, F. (2004b) 'Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World,' *Third World Quarterly* 25, 6: 1061-78.

WALSH, S. (2008) "'Uncomfortable Collaborations': Contesting Constructions of the "Poor" in South Africa,' *Review of African Political Economy* 35, 116: 255-79.

WALTZ, K. (1979) *A Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA.: Addison Wesley.

WILLIAMS, P. and I. TAYLOR (2000) 'Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the 'New' South Africa', *New Political Economy* 5, 1: 21-40.

Table 1: Patterns of Social Relations of Production

Pattern of Social Relations of Production	Brief Description
Corporate	The workforce demonstrates loyalty to the corporations they work for due to protection schemes (e.g. company insurance) and strategies to integrate workers into the aims of the firm.
Tripartism	Workers belong to trade unions and tripartite bargaining takes place between the state, firms and trade unions.
Enterprise	Here the conditions for workers are not greatly affected by trade unions or government legislation, but are directly subject to the discipline of the market.
State Corporatism	In this pattern it is the power of the state that rules over both management and workers. Historically associated with bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.
Self Employment	Tends to be inherently precarious and often includes small-scale commodity producers, such as family farmers or shopkeepers. The direct producer employs him/herself and ekes out a living through narrow price differentials between inputs and outputs
Household	This includes child rearing and other household activities such as food preparation. Such activities are not given a monetary value in official statistics.
Casual	Earnings are extralegal and are based on one-off transactions that are not cumulative or continuous.
Peasant	Typically tenant farmers who are subordinate to a dominant class who extract the surplus produced.

Notes

¹ On the history of the ‘fear of the mass’, see Balibar (1993). Policy analyses from the RAND-corporation have drawn similar conclusions (Nichiporuk 2000).

² In the ‘third image’ the state is treated as a unitary actor that is autonomous from civil society and the state system is understood in terms of the balance of power and capability of such unitary actors (Waltz 1979).

³ For similar analyses to Bayat concerned with other parts of the world, see Moser (2004), Beall (2002), Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2000), Perlman (2002) and (2003).

⁴ This is the modified typology presented in Harrod (2006), which varies from the 1987 typology, reflecting empirical changes in the world economy as well as dissatisfaction by Harrod over the terminology used in the 1987 version.

⁵ Although Davies and Ryner (2006b) is one attempt to update the analysis it is primarily concerned with questions of theory and concept formation.

⁶ Self employment tends to be associated with anti-statism (taxes threaten their profit margins), but not necessarily radical individualism. To stabilise markets the self-employed have tended to organise cartels, cooperative marketing and finance groups. Hence, self employment is associated with an oscillation/combination of a rugged individualist image with organised self defence, which has generated a disposition towards populist politics based on a direct relationship with a ‘strong leader’ not inhibited by bureaucratic intermediaries (Cox 1987: 52-55).

⁷ The desperate struggle for survival makes casuals highly instrumental in pursuing opportunities to secure material subsistence, yet they are simultaneously disposed towards millennialist projects. Harrod (1987, 2006) explains this as the result of the absence of a concrete personified ‘other’ (like a factory owner or boss) in the more diffuse power relations that they confront, inviting more metaphysical explanations of their plight, which can be combined with a complete and violent rejection of the present and an affirmation of a utopian future in future history or in a life beyond.

⁸ 80 percent of Tunisian exports and 70 percent of imports are with the EU. The EU is the source of 90 percent of tourist receipt and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Tunisia. In addition, foreign exchange inflows from remittances by the 600 000 Tunisians residing in the EU were in 1995 equivalent to 3-4 percent of Tunisian GDP.

⁹ On the Uruguay Round, its effect on the Lomé Convention and the neoliberalisation of the relationship between the EU and the former colonies of its member states, see Hurt (2003).

¹⁰ The proportion of the working population in agriculture has decreased in Tunisia from 41 percent in 1966, to 32.5 percent in 1974 and 21 percent in 1994 (Calculations based on ILO, 2007).

¹¹ ‘Praetorian’ is a reference to the ‘Praetorian Guards’ of imperial Rome, which provided an autonomous coercive power base for the Emperor. The Praetorian Guards swore a personal allegiance to the emperor in exchange for personal patrimony, and their own internal unity and cohesion depended on a self-referential esprit d’corps. It is suggested that Arab elites have exercised a similar form of authority in MENA since the 7th century.

¹² See Deutsch et. al. (1957).

¹³ According to Volpi none of these conceptions embrace democracy without caveats. Liberal democracy entails certain commitments to individual rights that ‘trump’ majority rule. In the same way, republican and Islamic conceptions have certain, communal rather than individualistic, non-negotiable conceptions that ‘trump’ majority rule.

¹⁴ Winch pointed to the over-determined relations between language and material life, rendering the base-structure distinction meaningless. On the contingent articulation of social subjectivities through a ‘logic of the symbolic’ that does not follow the ‘literal logic’ of the base-superstructure model, see Laclau (1988).